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This commentary attempts to make two points: First, although Purves, Morgenstern, and Wojtach
(PMW) are likely correct that the retinal image alone is an insufficient basis for successful
visually guided action (Purves et al., 2015a, p. 1), their “vision as reflexive” strategy emphasizes
the perceptual associations and neural portions of the visual system at the cost of understating
the central role environmental information plays in vision. Second, although PMW are correct
that early empirical strategies did not sufficiently incorporate neural aspects of the visual system
(pp. 2–4), recent attempts to demonstrate how affordances relate to the nervous system help
demonstrate that ecological psychology (EP, Gibson, 1966/1983, 1979/1986) remains a viable
empirical framework for investigating and explaining vision.
EP is in agreement with PMW that retinal images alone are insufficient for visually guided
action (Purves et al., 2015a, p. 1). PMW’s “vision as reflexive” strategy (Purves et al., 2015a) claims
that the link between stimulus and behavior that gives rise to visual perceptions “does not entail
representing reality as such” (Purves et al., 2015b, p. 2). What matters for vision is the strength of
reflexive bonds underlying perceptual associations that are reinforced over evolutionary timescales
(Purves et al., 2015a, pp. 6–8; Purves et al., 2015b, p. 2). Although there are parts of this “reflexive”
strategy that are congruent with EP, the inferred, indirect, and representational conception of vision
on offer by PMW is incompatible with EP’s central theoretical commitments.
EP emphasizes the idea that vision occurs in perceptual systems, where “perceptual system”
refers to the animal-environment system (Favela and Chemero, 2016). When visually-guided
action occurs in animals like us, it does so with our eyes connected to a brain, in a head,
on a neck, on a body, with legs that move in particular ways while engaging with an
environment with particular features. Understood in this way, vision is just as much action
as perception, and it is an action that unfolds over time. Though the retinal image alone
may not be sufficient to specify properties of the environment such as size and distance,
environmental information such as optic energy structures are rich enough. “Information”
is used in EP in terms of energy distributions (e.g., light and sound) specific to the layout
of the world, and is revealed to an animal via its perceptual capacities as it moves. Along
these lines, information is a systems-based, relational feature between animal and environment
(Chemero, 2009). Energy distributions surrounding an animal can be rich with information
that specifies action-relevant properties of the world (Fajen et al., 2008). Such properties are
affordances, or opportunities for action. The perception of affordances has been demonstrated in
investigations of the perception of gap sizes (Barac-Cikoja and Turvey, 1993), stand-on-ability
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of slopes (Fitzpatrick et al., 1994), catching moving objects
(Oudejans et al., 1996), sit-on-ability (Mark, 1987), step-on-
ability (Warren, 1984), and the pass-through-ability of apertures
(Warren and Whang, 1987), just to name a few. Appealing to the
structure of environmental information when accounting for the
results is common across all of these perceptual experiments.
Temporality plays another major role in the ability of an
animal to perceive affordances. Consider that a tree’s distance is
not specified by the retinal image alone, i.e., a tree that is small
and near would cast the same retinal image as one large and
far. However, since animals are always in motion, environmental
cues such as motion parallax can facilitate the specification of
features of objects such as size and distance. These considerations
lend support to the current claim that although PMW’s “vision
as reflexive” strategy is correct to shift focus away from the
retinal image as the basis of vision, they need not understate the
richness of information available in the environment to specify
features relevant to visually-guided behavior. Furthermore, the
sample of studies above lend support to the notion that, contra
PMW, environmental information can specify an animal’s reality
as such.
Next, I draw attention to the continued viability of EP
as an empirical framework for investigating and explaining
vision. PMW state that, like other early empirical strategies,
EP has, “suffered from an absence of ties to the structure and
function of animal visual systems” (Purves et al., 2015a, p. 3).
This is a justified criticism. Although ecological psychologists
do not study the nervous system per se (e.g., single neuron
recordings, etc.), investigations friendly to EP at the intersection
of the neural sciences and perceptual psychology have begun to
connect research on affordance perception and associated neural
physiology. Directly inspired by Gibson, Cisek’s “affordance
competition hypothesis” (Cisek, 2007; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010)
takes an embodied, sensorimotor approach to explaining the
neural underpinnings of how animals make action selections
amid environments containing multiple relevant affordances.
Duran and Thill (2012) present the “dynamic field theory” as a
neurophysiologically inspired dynamical systems framework for
modeling relationships among affordances and language. Mizelle
et al. (2013) investigated potential neural networks underlying
the perception of affordances that could facilitate goal-directed
actions (i.e., “functional affordance”) and those affordances that
are actually used to achieve a goal (i.e., “physical affordance”).
In addition, Young (2006) utilized evidence from patients with
visual pathologies to develop a way to categorize affordances
based upon their neurological underpinnings.
Though some of these studies modify Gibson’s original
conception of affordances (e.g., Gibson, 1979/1986), they remain
compatible with the EP strategy as a whole, particularly the
role affordances play in direct perception (cf. Michaels and
Carello, 1981; de Wit et al., 2015). By incorporating relevant
neurophysiological features of the visual system into accounts of
affordance perception, EP remains a viable empirical framework
for investigating and explaining vision. Moreover, it remains a
framework that need not abandon its commitments to central
tenets such as perceptual systems as the objects of investigation
and environmental information as being rich enough to specify
features of the world.
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